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I took over as Chair of the Faculty from
Simon Blackburn on his retirement last 
year. We said goodbye formally to Simon –
shown on the right appreciating one of his
retirement gifts – at a lovely party at Trinity
in the summer. Fortunately, Simon will still
be living in Cambridge for most of the year,
so we haven’t lost him altogether.
Since then it’s been a busy year. Huw 
Price has stepped into Simon’s chair (if 
that is what one does with a chair) and is 
already making his mark on the Faculty with
workshops, conferences and new initiatives,
like the new cross-Cambridge Philosophy 
of Science group (which Huw has named
with the catchy acronym ‘CAMPOS’: see 
our interview on p. 4). But all members of
the Faculty have been busy too this year,
with what seems to be a record number 
of conferences on ethics, logic and the
philosophy of mind. Details of these events
can be found on our website; and of course,
Cambridge Philosophy alumni are always
very welcome to attend these.
Richard Holton and Rae Langton from
MIT have been our Faculty Visitors this year,
and have made a tremendous contribution
in giving talks, attending seminars and just
being around. Their visit coincides with a
new collaboration we have set up with 
two philosophy departments – MIT 
and Harvard – in the ‘other’ Cambridge.
Members of our Faculty share many
philosophical interests with members of
those departments. Our plan is to have 
joint meetings once a year with faculty
members and graduate students in all three
‘Cambridge’ departments, possibly with an
eye to faculty and graduate exchanges in
the future. Our ﬁrst discussions came up
with the name ‘Cambridge-Cambridge’ but
Alex Byrne from MIT invented ‘Cambridge2’,
which seems to have stuck.
The main event of the year, though, has
undoubtedly been the appointment of
three new lecturers in February. We were
looking to appoint a lecturer in the history
of philosophy (an area where we have not
been strong for a while) and to strengthen
our proﬁle in ethics, especially important
since Simon Blackburn’s departure. But 
we were fortunate that the University
agreed to fund another post in addition, 
to replace one of our senior colleagues 
who will be retiring soon.
Our job advert delivered a daunting 
338 applications. A long and complex
process ended up with us appointing
Paulina Sliwa to the position in ethics,
Angela Breitenbach to the history of
philosophy job, and Tim Button to the 
third position.
Paulina was an undergraduate in Oxford,
and has just ﬁnished her PhD at MIT. She
works on epistemology and ethics, and
especially on the connections between
them. Angela is an expert on Kant’s
philosophy; she comes to Cambridge 
from a lectureship at the University of East
Anglia. Tim is currently a research fellow at
St John’s, Cambridge, and did his PhD in 
the Faculty. He works on metaphysics, 
logic and the philosophy of language. 
We are delighted to welcome these three
outstanding and energetic philosophers 
to the Faculty, and we hope they will be
very happy here.
We are still a small Faculty, with only 
12 permanent lecturers and professors. 
So together with Huw’s appointment last
year, these appointments represent the
largest single change in the Faculty’s 
overall composition for decades. Like all
universities, we face an uncertain future
with the current changes to university
funding in the UK in the coming years. 
It is reassuring that we can enter this 
period as a powerful and dynamic group 
of philosophers. 
From the Chair
Tim Crane
Simon Blackburn at his retirement garden party, Trinity College
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Jean Buridan discusses medieval
philosophy at Cambridge.
“Will you write a piece for our newsletter?”
the Cambridge Philosophy Faculty asked
me. In my day – nearly 700 years ago, 
Paris, where I taught, was of course, the
best place. We took Oxford seriously, but
Cambridge – please readers, don’t be
oﬀended – was a real backwater: a few
discontented masters, camping out near
the fens. It’s all diﬀerent now. On the 
banks of the Seine they talk nonsense
when they are not on strike, while it 
was here in Cambridge, that people 
ﬁrst started, nearly a century ago, doing
again what I recognize as philosophy.
The problem is that Cambridge has
asked me to write, not about philosophy 
in Cambridge, but medieval philosophy
here. “Medieval philosophy – what is that?”
I asked myself. Luckily, I could put the
question to my translator, John Marenbon.
“What they mean”, John told me, “is the
type of stuﬀ you did”. But, before I could
reply he went on: “But it’s really not so
simple. I have just given an Inaugural
Lecture” – he seemed very pleased with
himself when he pronounced these words
– “called When was Medieval Philosophy? 
I argued that, in one sense, it was 
now – because we have to make it
comprehensible to us today, and in
another sense, never, because the 
usual period boundaries – 500–1500 
or thereabouts, don’t make much sense”.
“What was your main point?” I asked,
sensing a danger that he would repeat 
the whole lecture verbatim. He answered:
“Although a philosophical training is
needed to understand and present
philosophy from the past, history of
philosophy is an historical exercise, from
which philosophers must not expect to 
ﬁnd arguments they can use now, but
which teaches them about the nature 
and limitations of their discipline.” 
“Are you the only person here interested
in what they call medieval philosophy?” 
I asked. He replied “Oh no – certainly 
not this year. We have Chris Martin from
Auckland visiting, as Leverhulme Professor.
He has been giving lectures on the
greatest logician between Aristotle 
and Frege”. I was beginning to feel
ﬂattered – to think, someone coming 
all those thousands of miles to talk about
me! I was preparing a suitably modest
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Medieval Philosophy comes to Cambridge
John Marenbon
rejoinder, when John added: “Peter
Abelard”. Peter who? I had never heard of
the man, but John assured me that Chris
had shown how, nearly 800 years before
Frege, Abelard had reached a reﬁned
understanding of propositional logic. Not
only were there the lectures; John himself
and Chris had been giving seminars on
Abelard’s metaphysics and his philosophy
of language. John could see I was a bit
crest-fallen. “But we’ve also been studying
you” he reassured me, “in our medieval
philosophy reading group. We meet
weekly, throughout the year. Last term 
it was your Sophisms. This term it’s Scotus
on universals...“ So John went on.
But, if medieval philosophy is ‘the sort 
of stuﬀ I used to do’, then I beg to disagree
with his account of medieval philosophy in
Cambridge. To my mind, what John does 
is not medieval philosophy at all, because 
it is done in an historical spirit, which is
characteristically modern. In our time, we
read Aristotle, indeed – but we thought 
of him as our contemporary. What most
separates a twenty-ﬁrst century outlook
from a medieval one is historical self-
consciousness. But there is plenty 
of genuine medieval philosophy in
Cambridge. It’s what all of the the Faculty
(except John and one or two others) 
do most of the time. They are are all
scholastics like me, delighting in the 
same sort of intricate problems, precise
reasoning and technical language. Like 
me, they see a training in logic as the
beginning of all good philosophizing and,
like me too, nothing in the end fascinates
most of them more than really diﬃcult
logical problems. At their lectures I feel
completely at home (sometimes, indeed, 
I said the same things myself long ago). 
But please, please, don’t make me go and
read Scotus.
Jean Buridan was Professor of
Philosophy at the University of Paris,
from c. 1320 to c. 1360. His comments
were translated into English by John
Marenbon, Honorary Professor of
Medieval Philosophy in the University
of Cambridge. A podcast and typescript
of John’s inaugural lecture is also
available from the Faculty website.
Jean Buridan by permission of the Jagiellonian Library
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Which is better – art or morality? 
The dominant view amongst moral
philosophers appears to be that morality 
is overriding. This view informs our 
ethical theories; paradigmatically,
consequentialism which has at its heart 
the claim that we should always and
everywhere maximise the good. The 
odd thing is that few if any of us really
believe it! Take Parker’s Piece (the large
open space at the town end of Mill 
Road) lit only by ‘reality checkpoint’; 
the lamppost at its centre. There is a 
good case to be made – and every now
and then it is made – for better lighting. 
At night it is dark and, particularly for a
young woman on her own, frightening 
to cross. However, we do not light it for 
the simple reason that that would spoil it. 
It is much more beautiful unlit.
This raises the time-honoured question
of the relation between the good and the
beautiful. I should say ‘questions’ as indeed
there are many diﬀerent relations. This
issue is one that has hovered around the
Philosophy Faculty for many years; it was
something that bothered Bernard Williams
a great deal and also Michael Tanner – and
was at the heart of aesthetics teaching in
Cambridge. Indeed, when I ﬁrst came to
the Faculty in the late 1980s ‘Can a great
work of art also be immoral?’ was a
standard Tripos question. 
Recently there has been a ﬂurry of
papers published on the subject that 
have focussed on the rather narrow issue
of whether a feature of a work of art that 
is a moral ﬂaw is also an aesthetic ﬂaw. 
The issues here are uncertain; as Hallvard
Lillehammer has sensibly pointed out
(British Journal of Aesthetics, 2008), the
technical nature of the terms involved
makes the whole matter indeterminate. 
This literature contrasts with the rather
broader line taken by Richard Wollheim
who thought that our conception of 
value emerged from early in our psycho-
sexual development and took broadly 
two forms. The ﬁrst of these emerged 
in what Bernard Williams later called 
‘the morality system’; a structure heavy
with notions of guilt and obligation. 
The second involves the projection of
mental states onto the world and our
subsequent perception of the world 
as valuable. Although these do not
correspond in any simple way to a 
division between morality and aesthetics,
Wollheim none the less found the former
‘baleful’ in comparison to the latter – 
a thought he later expressed in one of 
my favourite lines in Philosophy: ‘though
good art is more likeable than bad art,
virtuous people do not enjoy this same
advantage…’ (Preface, The Mind and 
Its Depths).
The various philosophical discussions,
whether on the relation between 
moral ﬂaws and aesthetic ﬂaws or on 
the question of the relative merits of 
art and morality, are relevant to the 
way we understand particular works. 
The types of works in which these issues
tend to become salient are those that
depict the naked human form (in particular
the female form) or works that in other
ways, reﬂect doubtful social or political
mores. For a while now, disciplines such 
as English and Art History have studied
‘post-colonial’ works of art, or reﬂected on
colonial works of art from a post-colonial
standpoint. Consider, for example, General
Gordon’s Last Stand (1893) by George Joy,
which is now in the Leeds City Art Gallery.
This depicts a supremely calm General
Gordon facing the heathen hordes. Of
course, we could simply say that we do 
not have to make judgements here:
whether or not the picture has merit 
The Beautiful and the Good 
Derek Matravers
as a picture is independent of whether 
the attitude evinced by the painter in
painting the picture is dubious. We 
might be able to do this – simply 
judging the picture as pretty, or technically
proﬁcient. It is, however, diﬃcult to have
the experience the work demands of 
us without taking on in imagination
attitudes concerning race and empire. 
If this is so, and these attitudes are 
morally beyond the pale, this detracts 
from the value of the painting.
The issues raised here are partly for 
critics – how exactly should the painting
be understood? However, there are also
philosophical issues: What is it to engage
with a painting? How do the moral features
relate to other features? It also raises an
intriguing question ﬁrst raised by Hume 
in ‘On the Standard of Taste’ as to why 
we don’t seem able to leave our actual 
world morality behind when we engage
with works of art – particularly works that
are ﬁctional. There is also the question –
largely unexplored – as to what we 
should do with works that we ﬁnd
deﬁcient because they are immoral.
Answering these questions will edge 
us forward to understanding the good, 
the true, and the beautiful.
Derek Matravers gave the Alumni
Weekend lecture in 2011. He did his
PhD at Darwin College and was a
postdoctoral lecturer in the Faculty
from 1991–1994. 
He is currently Professor of
Philosophy at the Open University 
as well as Aﬃliated Lecturer in the
Faculty and Bye-Fellow and Director 
of Studies at Emmanuel College. 
General Gordon's Last Stand
Missed one of our events?
You can listen and download 
recordings of philosophy talks from 
Cambridge University iTunesU 
www.cam.ac.uk/video/itunesu.html
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Huw Price (Darwin 1977–81)
joined the Faculty of Philosophy in
October 2011. He was previously
ARC Federation Fellow and Challis
Professor of Philosophy at the
University of Sydney, where he 
had headed the Centre for Time
since 2002.
TC: Would you like to tell us a bit 
about your time at Cambridge and 
how it aﬀected your philosophical
development?
HP: I came here in the Autumn term 
in 1977. The reason I came here, really, 
was that I had the good fortune to 
bump into Hugh Mellor a couple of 
years before that, when I was still ﬁnishing
my undergraduate degree in Australia. 
I was more or less set on going on in pure
maths, and it was really some encouraging
remarks from Hugh which convinced me
that I should change my mind and do
more philosophy. That’s how a couple 
of years later I ended up coming to
Cambridge to work under his supervision
for a PhD. And that turned out to be very
inﬂuential indeed, in that the main things
I’ve worked on since then can all be traced
back in one way or another to things that
Hugh was interested in at that time, such
as probability and time.
TC: Do you see other links with other
parts of the Cambridge tradition in the
20th century or before?
HP: Yes, certainly, as my views developed
after that. One person who was very
inﬂuential was Peter Menzies. Through
him, I think, I moved from an interest in
probability to an interest in causation and
problems of decision theory, and that led
me into an approach to the philosophy of
causation which is very much a Cambridge
one, in terms of agency. That’s an approach
we can ﬁnd in the very late work of Ramsey
and then later in the 20th century in
Cambridge ﬁgures or Cambridge trained
ﬁgures such as von Wright and Gasking.
TC: You also have of course, a strong
interest in philosophy of science. 
Your book on time: Time’s Arrow 
and Archimedes Point has been very
inﬂuential and well-received, and has
been of interest to physicists and
philosophers of physics too.
HP: Yes, and when it came out Jeremy
Butterﬁeld and Michael Redhead had 
their highly successful group in philosophy
of physics, between Philosophy and 
HPS, here in Cambridge. They had a 
reading group on my book, and I came 
to Cambridge and talked to people 
here about it. 
One of the attractions in coming 
back is that I can now work with people
like Jeremy, who himself is back in
Cambridge at Trinity, after some years 
at Oxford. Jeremy has strong links, and 
I have some in my own right, with some 
of the people in DAMTP (Department 
of Applied Mathematics and Theoretical
Physics) – in Quantum Information and
Foundations there, for example. One 
of the exciting things in coming back, 
is the opportunity to work with those
people on issues in the philosophy 
of physics.
Huw Price in conversation with Tim Crane 
TC: Do you also see the Faculty building
new links with other departments in the
University?
HP: I think it’s a really excellent time to
build, or perhaps reinforce, the link with
HPS in particular. There’s a new professor 
in HPS as well, Hasok Chang. He and 
I and Jeremy and others have talked 
over the last year about trying to do
something to raise the proﬁle of
philosophy of science in general at
Cambridge. It’s a rather Cambridge 
thing that there are these immense
strengths, but they’re rather diversely
spread – some people in the faculty, 
some people in HPS, people like Jeremy 
in colleges, and lots of individuals within
scientiﬁc departments who have an
interests in the philosophy of their 
own subject.
What we’d like to do is to provide 
a webpage and a network structure 
which makes all of that vast strength 
in philosophy of science visible both 
Tim Crane with the new Bertrand Russell Professor, Huw Price
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inside and outside the University, so that
people who are interested in particular 
bits of the topic, or people interested in
coming here as students to the Faculty 
or to HPS, can see just how rich what 
we have here is. We’re going to call it
CAMPOS (Cambridge Philosophy of
Science) which conveniently means 
‘ﬁelds’ in Spanish and Portuguese – 
so there’s a nice little pun there. We’re 
just working on getting our webpage
together, and we have a conference
coming up at the end of November in
conjunction with a large European funded
Philosophy of Science network. So that’s a
wonderful opportunity to do some things
even better than has been done in the
past, in part just by making them more
visible than before.
TC: That’s great to hear about 
your interests in philosophy of time 
and philosophy of science. Another
major interest is pragmatism. 
You’re organising a big workshop 
on Cambridge pragmatism in May
aren’t you?
HP: Yes, I mentioned earlier that some 
of the interests I’ve developed – in rather
pragmatic approaches to causation, for
example – ﬁtted in with themes that
existed in Cambridge philosophy over 
the last century or so. It occurred to me 
it was really broader than that. The case 
of causation was just one example of 
a certain kind of practical concern that 
you could ﬁnd in all sorts of Cambridge
ﬁgures, approaching a wide range of
topics. For example, in Hugh Mellor’s 
work on time and tense he’s interested 
in explaining how creatures in our 
situation naturally come to talk in 
tensed terms, without tense being 
in any sense a kind of fundamental
metaphysical feature of reality. You ﬁnd
similar themes in Elizabeth Anscombe’s
work on indexicality, for example. 
These people are not, in a general 
sense, people that you would think 
of as philosophical pragmatists, but in
particular parts of their work you ﬁnd 
this way of approaching philosophical
problems in terms of the practical role 
of the notions concerned in the lives of
creatures like us. That has long seemed 
to me to be the most interesting way of
characterising philosophical pragmatism
and I was struck by how much it was a
Cambridge tradition. I wanted to do
something to call attention to that, and 
to one or two ﬁgures in the past century
who get a little bit less attention than 
they should, and I thought this would 
be a good way of celebrating some of
those people.
TC: Excellent. Would you like to tell 
us about any other plans you have?
HP: Last summer, when I was on my 
way to Cambridge, I was thinking about
other things I might be able to do here,
which in some sense used the kind of
background that I had in things like
philosophy of time and pragmatism. 
I went to several conferences in 
Europe in September. At one of them, 
in Copenhagen, I met a man called Jaan
Tallinn, who was one of the people who
set up Skype. He turned out to be very
interested in what he calls ‘existential 
risk’ – that is, cataclysmic risk arising from
human technology (in particular in his
case, from developments in Artiﬁcial
Intelligence (AI). I was very interested 
in what he had to say about those issues.
But I also saw that there might be an
opportunity for me to play a role as a 
kind of catalyst bringing him and his
contacts and his interest in these issues
into contact with Cambridge, in order to
set up some kind of centre for research 
on these things here. 
Since I arrived here in October, I’ve 
been following that up. Jaan came to
Cambridge at the beginning of February
and gave a very well received public
lecture organised by CSaP (the Centre 
for Science and Policy). We are now
working on trying to ﬁnd funding for this
project. I’m pretty sure we’ll be able to do
that, and the whole thing is starting to take
shape. I regard it as a very interesting and
potentially extremely important project,
which draws on my kind of background 
in philosophy of time and so on, but also
takes philosophy out to make connections
with much broader issues.
TC: That’s very exciting. Could you say
in just a few sentences, what these
issues about existential risk might be?
HP: The general idea is that it’s possible
that developments in human technology
may lead to risks which are so serious 
that they could threaten the survival 
of the species. In the case of artiﬁcial
intelligence, it’s associated with the idea
that developments in machine intelligence
might get to the point where in some
sense, the machines get out of control. 
The kinds of cases that Jaan Tallinn talks
about, for example, are cases where you
have a system which is basically set up 
as a rather smart optimiser to run some
particular process. If that goes to the 
stage where in eﬀect, it can modify its 
own code then it’s doubtful whether it
would be controllable, and you get some
runaway process. Jaan thinks it could lead
in a very short time to what would, in
eﬀect, be a major species-threatening
ecological catastrophe.
Now some people are sceptical about
that. I’m not completely convinced 
myself, but I do think there’s a strong 
case that some time over the next century
or two we are going to encounter a major
transition, when we do really have AI
which is potentially, in some senses, 
a lot smarter than we are. That’s a major
transition for our species and it’s one 
which we really do need to think about
well in advance.
TC: One ﬁnal question. What are your
impressions of the Faculty after having
come back after so long?
HP: Well, my main impressions have been
what a congenial place it is to work, and
what a pleasant bunch of new colleagues 
I now have!
TC: It’s great to have you here and I look
forward to us working together for
many years. 
A podcast of their full conversation is
available from the Faculty website.
Future Events
Alumni Weekend 
22 September 2012
Professor Tim Crane will give a talk
entitled ‘What do Animals Think?’.
Further details will be available from
the Alumni Weekend website
(www.alumni.cam.ac.uk/weekend)
Routledge Lecture in Philosophy: 
Professor Susan Wolf from the
University of North Carolina will give
the 7th Routledge Lecture. Details to
be announced.
Further details about forthcoming
events will be available on the
Faculty website.
Awards, Honours and Promotions
Michael Potter was promoted to a
Professorship and Arif Ahmed to a 
Senior Lectureship.
Alex Oliver has won the prestigious 
Mind Association Research Fellowship 
for 2012–13.
Jeremy Butterfield was elected President
of the Mind Association for 2012–2013. He
was also invited to give the 2012 Ernest
Nagel memorial lecture at Columbia
University. This is a triennial lecture to
honour the memory of Ernest Nagel and to
preserve the heritage of his contributions
to Logic and the Philosophy of Science.
Arrivals
Sophia Connell, Adam Stewart-Wallace
and Sacha Golob were appointed to
temporary lectureships in the Faculty.
Christopher Martin (University of
Auckland, New Zealand) spent two terms
in the Faculty as Leverhulme Visiting
Professor. He delivered a set of public
Wildman was appointed as a Research
Associate at the University of Hamburg.
Christine Tiefensee has a 6 year research
post at the University of Bamberg. 
Emily Caddick has a part time Teaching
Oﬃcer Post at the Institute of Continuing
Education, Madingley Hall, and a Jacobsen
Fellowship at the Institute of Philosophy.
Adrian Boutel has a post-doctoral
research position in the Faculty of History
and Philosophy of Science, starting
Autumn 2012. Steven Methven has 
a 4-year JRF at Worcester College, 
Oxford, and Tom Simpson a JRF at 
Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge for 
3 years, from Sept 2012.
Student Prizes
The Matthew Buncombe prize for best
overall achievement in the MPhil degree
was awarded to Max Hayward (Trinity).
The Craig Taylor prize for best performance
in Part IB went to Bastian Stern (Trinity).
The Part II prize went to Katharine Jenkins
(Emmanuel).
lectures on the development of logic in 
the twelfth century. 
Richard Holton and Rae Langton (MIT)
were Faculty Visitors for two terms.
Appointments
Tim Crane has been appointed as the
Philosophy Editor of the Times Literary
Supplement.
College Teaching Oﬃcer, Nick Treanor
has been appointed to a Chancellor’s
Fellowship at the University of Edinburgh
from August 2012.
Richard Child, Mellon Postdoctoral 
Fellow in Social Justice and Criminal 
Justice has been appointed to a
lectureship at Manchester University
starting in September 2012. 
Temporary lecturer Sacha Golob has 
been appointed to a lectureship at Kings
College, London from October 2012.
We are delighted that a number of our
recent graduates have been appointed 
to academic posts. Among them, Nathan
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Other News
Fundraising 
The Faculty has initiated a new fund to help support 
graduate students in the future. The fund was kick-started 
by a generous donation from Professor Emeritus Hugh 
Mellor. As ever, we are grateful to the Development Oﬃce 
for their help in our fund-raising eﬀorts.
Faculty ranking
In the 2011 Philosophical Gourmet Report, Cambridge is 
now ranked second in the UK, after Oxford (the Faculty in
Oxford is at least ﬁve times the size of Cambridge’s).
Your comments and contributions are always welcome. 
Please send them to the Editor at:
Mrs Jenni Lecky-Thompson
Faculty of Philosophy
University of Cambridge
Sidgwick Avenue
Cambridge
CB3 9DA
email: jel52@cam.ac.uk
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Mental health
problems can prompt
a search for meaning
and a range of
questions which,
ostensibly at least, 
fall into the purview
of philosophers. In
the broadest terms,
what’s it all about and what’s it all for?
More speciﬁcally perhaps, what is
happiness, and am I equipped to get 
it? What makes me “me”, and do “I” survive
through incoherence, through changes 
of character or mood brought on by 
illness or prescriptions? Even, what is the
world like, and how do I know whether 
it accords with my perception of it?
If it’s right that those who suﬀer mental
distress are particularly prone to ask
abstract and fundamental questions, 
and to require an answer to them with 
a particular urgency, should philosophy
strike a special chord with those who have
had the hardest lives? Should philosophy
help people by giving them the tools to
Public Philosophy 
Harry Adamson
answer those questions, or at least provide
the comfort of knowing they’re not alone
in asking them?
The Stuart Low Trust is a London-based
mental health charity set up to provide
non-medical, community support to
promote wellbeing. A short while after 
I had ﬁnished my doctorate at Cambridge 
I was asked to speak at one of their events
on the views of philosophers on happiness.
Much to my surprise there was enough
positive response for them to suggest 
a weekly talk. I thought an interactive
approach would work best, and together
with Rachel Paine, another philosopher
who had worked with the Trust, began 
the Philosophy Forum: www.slt.org.uk/
philosophy-forum.
A diﬀerent speaker comes in every 
week, and introduces a question: What is
happiness? What is a person? What can
you know for certain? etc. The audience
subdivides into groups of four or so, and
volunteers then run mini-seminars where
those participating get to talk through
their own thoughts and hear those of
others. The group then gets back together
and the main speaker will take people
through a bit of the philosophical literature
before introducing a second question,
which is a logical development of the ﬁrst.
The whole process then repeats, with tea
and talk in the middle.
The numbers have been high, and the
feedback amazingly positive from an
engaged and appreciative audience.
Running the mini-seminars has been a 
joy for the volunteers – full of interesting
and moving moments. We have received
suﬃcient donations to expand a little into
other groups that can provide philosophy
to vulnerable people.
Current or former students would be
more than welcome to volunteer – please
do! For details and donations contact
stuartlowphilosophy@gmail.com.
During Lent Term 2012, the Centre for
Research in the Arts, Social Sciences and
Humanities (CRASSH) hosted a series of
eight interdisciplinary seminars entitled
‘Ethics at the Intersection of Philosophy
and Anthropology’. Led by Mellon
Teaching Fellows James Laidlaw (Social
Anthropology/King’s College) and Hallvard
Lillehammer (Philosophy/Churchill
College), this pilot project brought
together graduate students and senior
members from Biological Anthropology,
Divinity, Education, Development Studies,
Family Research, History, Philosophy, 
Public Health, and Social Anthropology 
in Cambridge; as well as visiting scholars
from Manchester and MIT, to explore
common themes in recent philosophical
and anthropological work on the nature 
of ethical thought and practice.
Over the last decade or so, there 
has been a growing trend among
philosophers and anthropologists to 
draw on the work of scholars in each
other’s discipline. Yet until now, this 
trend has yet to result in any systematic
dialogue across the disciplinary divide,
either in Cambridge or elsewhere. This 
fact was clearly visible during the course 
of the seminars, where anthropologically
trained participants would sometimes 
be puzzled by the choices made by
philosophers of anthropological sources,
and philosophically trained participants
would equally be surprised at some 
of the philosophical sources used by
anthropologists. Rather than being 
an obstacle to constructive discussion,
however, these moments of puzzlement
and surprise functioned as creative 
spurs to the exploration of mutually
recognisable themes; from theoretical
discussions of ethical relativism, virtue 
or social explanation on the one hand, 
to ethnographic discussions of spirit
possession in Madagascar, Islamic revival 
in Egypt, or ‘criminal castes’ in south 
India on the other.
During the course of the term, 
there was inevitably a certain amount 
of disagreement among the seminar
participants. Yet there was also a signiﬁcant
amount of agreement – perhaps more 
so than some of us had expected. There
was also a decent amount of laughter.
Those of us who came with a desire to
learn something new deﬁnitely did so –
enough to convince the organisers to
continue the conversation. 
Mellon Seminars on Ethics, 
Philosophy and Anthropology 
Hallvard Lillehammer
Harry Adamson
If I could say one thing about my time at
Cambridge, it would be that I left there
more thoughtful than when I arrived – 
and in more ways than one. Studying
Philosophy for three years definitely
improved my ability to answer questions
and to question answers, through an
analytical lens that I wasn’t always aware 
I was developing. When I opted to study
Philosophy it was because I wasn’t clear
about my career direction, and I wanted 
to study something that could sustain 
my interest for an extended period of time.
I found Philosophy interesting because 
I liked an argument, and learning lots 
of new ways to argue was obviously
appealing to me. In addition, I found it
fascinating to learn that people had been
asking the same questions and having 
the same arguments for centuries. 
Aside from formal study, Cambridge
introduced me to people from a range 
of backgrounds who taught me about
difference, and about myself. Learning 
how to live, study and socialise with 
people from around the country was a 
life-informing experience for this London
girl, and prepared me for a career working
with a mosaic of personalities. Whether it’s
meeting with politicians, doing press
interviews, or building bridges with a 
range of activists, since leaving University 
on pursuing debates in a thoughtful
manner. In addition to such group-
based thinking, I am now one year into 
a Professional Doctorate. Having the space
for personal thought, and to develop and
challenge my positions on social issues, 
is crucial for me to be confident in the
recommendations I make professionally. 
A challenge of social policy is its weakness
to knee-jerk development. Working on
policy with a backdrop of considered
thought increases the likelihood that 
my conclusions are holistic; and that is
important to me. 
During my Cambridge interview I
remember stereotypically quoting
Descartes’  ‘I think therefore I am’. While 
I cringe at that memory now, I can also
smile to myself and think that a change
may be in order: when it comes to me, 
‘I question therefore I am’ and I can’t
imagine a time when I won’t be. 
Carlene Firmin, MBE (Fitzwilliam 
2002–05) is social policy advisor
specialising in preventing gang
violence, violence against girls, and 
the sexual exploitation of children 
and young people. From 2006 to 2011
she researched the impact of criminal
gangs on women and girls while
working for the charity Race on the
Agenda and in 2011 she took up the
post of Assistant Director of Policy 
and Research at children’s charity
Barnardo’s. Carlene has authored 
a number of research reports and
currently writes a monthly column in
the Guardian Society. She is a board
member of the Prison Reform Trust,
Hibiscus, and The GAG Project, which
she founded in 2010. 
I have always worked in a landscape of
difference. But being accepted into a 
world that was so different to the one 
I had grown up in was as profound as 
the friends I made over the three years 
of my degree. Following my interview for
my place, I was convinced that I hadn’t 
got into Cambridge, and I was beyond
stunned when I realised I had. Getting 
into, and staying in, an environment as
academically and socially challenging 
as Cambridge gave me a greater sense 
of self-belief and a desire to be a 
barrier breaker.
Becoming more thoughtful has
informed my entire career. The success 
of my research into girls affected by gang
violence was born out of an ability to ask
questions about serious youth violence 
in a different way. While people had spent
years focused on boys involved in gangs,
few had considered girls, and even fewer
had interviewed them. My current role
advising the Office of the Children’s
Commissioner’s Inquiry into Child 
Sexual Exploitation in Gangs and 
Groups requires me to develop and
challenge questions and answers to 
ensure the Inquiry provides the findings
and recommendations to change
children’s lives. And each month when 
I write my column for Society Guardian 
I have to come up with a new question
about a current issue and explore it 
in a way that a wide audience can 
engage with. 
Embedding my academic journey in
Philosophy has also kept me interested 
in studying as a means of questioning 
and learning. Having worked at social
policy charity Race on the Agenda for 
a year, I began seeking greater knowledge
and understanding than my workplace
alone could afford me. This led me to
complete a Masters Degree in Social 
Policy and Planning at the London School
of Economics. I often found myself having
heated debates with my fellow students
about whether or not there was a ‘social
underclass’ and what was the actual
purpose of criminal justice system. I would
always retreat to my philosophical roots 
to form and change my position, intent 
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